The 
Introduction
While much has recently been written on the issue of torture, motivated in part by events in the 'war on terror', 1 the discussion has inevitably centred on the prohibition of torture 2 and has expended very little attention on the related questions of procedural law. It is only recently that the question of whether and in what circumstances cogens. 12 It is generally understood to be without any exceptions whatsoever, 13 but attempts have recently been made to reduce the prohibition, allowing torture in situations of grave emergency, 14 for instance, in the notorious case of the ticking time bomb. 15 Any such exception from the general prohibition of torture would, however, fail to have an effect on the prohibition insofar as it underlies the subject of the present essay. There is no such state of emergency in situations where the authorities use torture in order to obtain evidence for subsequent court proceedings. Besides, even if the authorities originally used torture in an emergency and therefore lawfully, any evidence thus gained need not be admissible in court later. Only the presence of a great danger could give rise to emergency powers and those emergency powers would lapse the moment the danger has subsided. The emergency would thus only affect the immediate question of the lawfulness of torture, but not its later consequences; no such later effect would be required by the emergency. 16 It may therefore be said that, so far as the present subject is concerned, the prohibition of torture is indeed absolute, regardless of recent attempts to reduce the prohibition.
General Issues under Article 15 UNCAT
The case of A and Others has raised a few issues of general application relating to Article 15 of the Convention against Torture (UNCAT), which will be examined at the outset, before the application of the article to different scenarios is discussed. Article 15 UNCAT provides as follows:
Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.
A Content of the Obligation
The first general question is whether Article 15 UNCAT directly forbids the production of improperly obtained evidence in any case or whether it is limited to a general 12 The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, 38 ILM (1999) Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 275; Justice J'Kedmi, supra note 14. 16 See Art. 15(1) ECHR, Art. 15(2) ECHR rules out any derogation from Art. 3, so that the requirements for exceptions from that prohibition would probably have to be stricter still, if they were viewed as permissible at all. obligation of the state to adjust its legal order to the aim stated in the article. This question is closely related, in states where international treaties may form part of domestic law, 17 to the question of whether the UNCAT is 'self-executing' 18 or 'directly applicable'.
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It was addressed in A and Others, where Lord Justice Neuberger in the Court of Appeal derived from the opening words of the provision that Article [15] envisages that each contracting state will ensure that evidence obtained by torture cannot be relied on in its national courts.
[It] therefore carries with it the notion that, if the current national law does not have such an exclusionary rule, something more will have to be done by the national government to ensure that it does.
20
The opening words of Article 15 UNCAT do not force this conclusion. A reference to the 'state party' in an international treaty does not necessarily differentiate between the government and other organs of the state; 21 it therefore does not suggest that the other organs are not likewise bound. Under general international law, the state is responsible for the conduct of all of its organs, regardless of any classification under domestic law, 22 so that the state is regarded as only one entity.
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Also, the use of the verb 'to ensure' need not mean that the state must only take measures in legislation or similar general action, i.e. 'at one remove' from the actual decisions on the admissibility of evidence. This impression could arise if Article 15 UNCAT provided that each state party shall ensure that evidence is not ruled admissible. But given that the article refers -in its description of the aim to be ensured -to the invocation of evidence, the use of the verb 'to ensure' is only necessary to express the duty to rule such evidence inadmissible and to thus 'ensure' that improper evidence is not 'invoked'. Furthermore, the subject-matter of the provision clearly concerns the judiciary, rather than primarily the legislator or the government, 24 which suggests that it is also directed towards the judiciary. Nevertheless, the fact that the CAT has considered individual complaints under Article 15 UNCAT strongly suggests that the article can be violated in individual cases.
State practice on this point is also far from uniform: when ratifying the Convention, Austria deposited a declaration stating that 'Austria regards article 15 of the Convention as the legal basis for the inadmissibility provided therein of the use of statements which are established to have been made as a result of torture.' 27 However, Germany appeared to hold the opposite view 28 and the United States expressly declared that Articles 1 through 16 UNCAT were not self-executing, 29 although this sweeping statement may not mean all that it appears to do, given its legislative background 30 and the situation under US constitutional law. 31 State practice therefore does not give much assistance either way. The conclusion must therefore remain as determined by the wording of Article 15 UNCAT, i.e. that the provision is violated in every instance of a successful invocation of evidence coming within its scope of application. Indeed, as the German Federal Constitutional Court held in 1994, 'there are no indications that [Article 15 UNCAT] was only intended to give rise to an obligation of the contracting states to enact statutory provisions on the inadmissibility of evidence and that no directly applicable law was therefore created'.
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B The Burden of Proof
The next question of general application is who must prove an incident of torture before Article 15 UNCAT demands the exclusion of any resulting evidence as inadmissible. Under the terms of Article 15 UNCAT, it must be 'established' that the relevant statements were made as a result of torture. This led the majority of the Court of Appeal in A and Others to state that the onus is on the person against whom such Ibid., at 264. BVerfG, supra note 24 (translation by the author). The OLG Hamburg, supra note 24, adopted this assessment almost verbatim. Neither court even considered the German declaration. evidence is used. 33 The House of Lords, however, was unanimous in holding that it would be unfair to put the burden of proof on this person, because he or she has very few means of investigation. 34 The House therefore concluded that the person against whom the suspect evidence is brought need only ask the SIAC to review the provenance of such a statement, pointing out perhaps that the evidence had been provided by a state known to practice torture; this would cause the duty of investigating the background of suspect pieces of evidence to pass to the SIAC itself.
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It is certainly true that a general burden of proof on the person alleging torture under Article 15 UNCAT would violate the procedural implications of the right against self-incrimination. 36 But it seems doubtful whether any provision on the burden of proof could properly be derived from Article 15 UNCAT, and the House of Lords seems to have arrived at its above-mentioned conclusion based not on Article 15 UNCAT, but on the basis of domestic law. This is eminently sensible, because the mere requirement that a statement is established to have been made as a result of torture does not mean that the proof of this incident of torture must be brought forward by any particular person. Also, any provision of Article 15 UNCAT on the burden of proof would be impossible to implement in the inquisitorial system of criminal trials. An onus on the accused is alien to this system, in which the court itself must ascertain the facts and in which no burden of proof therefore exists, be it on the accused or on the prosecution. 37 Article 15 UNCAT therefore does not prescribe in detail who should bear the burden of proof. This is also not contradicted by the practice of the CAT, which the Court of Appeal misunderstood as saying that Article 15 UNCAT imposed a burden of proof on the person raising the claim of torture. 38 41 This point of international procedural law does not therefore mean that Article 15 UNCAT imposes any regulation on the burden of proof on states parties.
Nevertheless, the conclusion of the House of Lords described above would appear to be the one required by international law. This is because the question of the burden of proof is indirectly affected by the interpretation given to Article 15 UNCAT by the CAT, according to which the article 'implies . . . an obligation for each state party to ascertain whether or not statements admitted as evidence in any proceedings for which it has jurisdiction . . . have been made as a result of torture'. 42 A state would clearly not comply with this positive duty if it were to impose the burden of proof for the requirements of Article 15 UNCAT on a private person. On the other hand, this positive obligation cannot mean that omitting a completely pointless examination even in entirely unproblematic cases would be in violation of international law. Therefore, the state's duty to investigate is only triggered by the presence of clues as to the possible provenance of the statements concerned from incidents of torture. This means that, even if the ordinary rules in a legal order impose the burden of proof on this question on a private person, the private person need only present the required clues in order to satisfy that burden. It is then incumbent on the competent state organ in any case to examine all suspect evidence with a view to its admissibility under Article 15 UNCAT.
Article 15 UNCAT may therefore be concluded not to impose any burden of proof, but to reduce any burden of proof on persons other than the state to an evidentiary burden only of triggering the positive obligation of the state. 43 This is what the House of Lords decided would happen under English law; the decision of the House therefore appears to be quite correct. This may be compared to a similar issue under the ECHR: where it has been shown that an applicant has suffered injuries while in custody, the government must, by virtue of its positive obligation to protect prisoners from harm, demonstrate that these injuries did not result from mistreatment; see e.g. Ribitsch v. Austria, ECHR (1995) Series A, No. 336, at 25-26 (para. 34). 44 The House was divided on another issue, namely whether evidence would be excluded when there was only a risk that it had been procured by torture: see A and Others (HL), supra note 5, at para. 118, per Lord Hope), the majority holding that it would not. This relates to what has to be proved and will not be discussed here.
The Different Situations of the Use of Evidence Obtained by Torture
Evidence obtained by torture may be used in a variety of situations: such evidence may be used against the tortured person or in court proceedings against a third person and, furthermore, the evidence may have been obtained by the state in the courts of which it is presented, or by another state. The different scenarios arising from these distinctions will be examined in turn.
A Use of Tainted Evidence in the Courts of the Torturer State against the Tortured Person
The 'classic' situation is that in which evidence obtained by torture is brought forward by the torturer state against the tortured person. 45 The information thus obtained is frequently a confession to a criminal offence that is later used by the prosecution in a criminal trial. There is no shortage of authority for the proposition that such evidence may not be brought, i.e. that it is inadmissible. 46 The reasons for this rule in international law will now be briefly examined.
Article 15 UNCAT
There can be no doubt that the wording of Article 15 UNCAT covers the situation where perpetrator and victim of torture are also, respectively, the forum state and the party against whom the tainted evidence is brought. 47 Indeed, the presentation of tainted evidence in these circumstances is certainly the classic case and therefore the one abuse of state power that Article 15 UNCAT was primarily intended to outlaw.
Article 6 ECHR
As regards the right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) ECHR, the most obviously relevant right is the right against self-incrimination (nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare). This right is not mentioned in Article 6, but appears in Article 14(3)(g) ICCPR and has accordingly been held to be implied in Article 6 ECHR, as part of 'generally recognised international standards'. 48 The rule is based on the unreliability of evidence obtained by coercion and on the desire to help prevent torture by making sure that the torturers do not gain from their acts, i. intended effect. 49 It is thus also related to the general principle according to which noone shall be allowed to profit from his own unlawful actions. 50 It may therefore be concluded that evidence obtained by torture is inadmissible also under Article 6(1) ECHR at least where it is adduced in the courts of the torturer state against the victim of torture.
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B Use of Tainted Evidence in the Courts of the Torturer State against a Person Other than the Victim of Torture
Torture has also frequently been used to exert from a person a witness statement for use in proceedings against another person, for instance, in order to obtain statements implicating another person in a crime.
Article 15 UNCAT
As before, the terms of Article 15 UNCAT are wide enough to encompass this case. The phrase 'any statement' 52 may also cover a statement of a person other than the one against whom the evidence is brought and the phrase 'any proceedings' 53 also extends to proceedings against a person other than the victim of torture. Even more clearly, the exclusion from the scope of Article 15 UNCAT of proceedings against a person accused of torture, i.e. the one person who certainly has not been a victim of torture, in the closing part of the article shows that the rule of inadmissibility would otherwise extend also to such a case.
54 Accordingly, there is nothing in the article to limit its protective effect to the person who was mistreated. This is confirmed by the historical background and the travaux préparatoires of Article 15 UNCAT. 56 The change from this to the present wording of Article 15 UNCAT was not intended to make any changes to the substance of the article, the drafters being anxious not to lessen the authority of the Declaration by promulgating any materially different rules. 57 It is therefore clear that Article 15 UNCAT also bans the use of evidence obtained by torture against a person who has not him-or herself been mistreated. 58 
Article 6(1) ECHR
The right against self-incrimination is not applicable in this context, as the statements in question do not incriminate the person making the statement. However, even in the absence of any specific right implied in Article 6 ECHR, the fairness of the trial as a whole still falls to be assessed, considering all possible factors. 59 In this regard, part of the basis of the exclusionary rule, 60 i.e. the unreliability of evidence obtained by torture, remains 61 and may be said to be even greater, since a person may be much more inclined to incriminate someone else under torture than him-or herself. The unreliability is even exacerbated by the fact that the person against whom statements made by another person under torture are used will rarely, if ever, be able to give evidence concerning the exact circumstances of the interrogation and the reliability of the statements. 62 This seriously diminishes the possibilities of the person concerned to mount an effective defence, 63 i.e. a right inherent in all the specific aspects of the general right to a fair trial 64 contained in Article 6(3) ECHR. 65 There are, in particular, similarities to the use of anonymous statements, which are also difficult to verify as to their truth and to the methods used to obtain them. 66 The conclusion that the use of statements made under torture also 68 Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) counts 'any relevant rules of international law. . .' among the context of the treaty provision to be interpreted 69 and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has, especially recently, placed great emphasis on the relevance of the international law surrounding the ECHR. 70 Thus, it has considered other international law when recognizing the binding force of its interim measures 71 and when delineating the reach of Article 1 ECHR, 72 and it has had special regard to other instruments on the protection of human rights. 73 There is, accordingly, nothing to prevent Article 15 UNCAT from strongly influencing the interpretation of Article 6 ECHR. It follows that, because Article 15 UNCAT applies to the production of evidence against one person of statements coerced from someone else, 74 the same conclusion on Article 6(1) ECHR is further reinforced.
C The Use of Tainted Evidence in the Courts of a State not Involved in the Act of Torture
Based on some of the above considerations, the real problem may be thought to arise in the case where the forum state is in no way responsible for the previous act of torture. Indeed, this distinction prompted the majority of the Court of Appeal in A and Others to hold that evidence obtained through torture by a foreign state would be admissible in an English court. 75 This finding was subsequently overruled by the House of Lords, which unanimously held that evidence obtained by torture was always inadmissible, regardless of where and by whom it was so procured. 76 In so doing, the majority of the House appears to have based its conclusions mostly on the English common law, but the following comments will relate only to 76 See supra note 5. the international legal issues involved. 77 The conclusions of the Court of Appeal and of the House will therefore be examined first on the basis of Article 15 UNCAT, and then with regard to Article 6(1) ECHR. Customary international law will also be addressed.
Article 15 UNCAT
The terms of the article ('any statement', 'any proceedings ') 78 are wide enough to encompass also the case where a state other than the forum state has committed the act of torture. This is confirmed by the Court of Appeal in A and Others, 79 which unfortunately held that such a conclusion was not possible under domestic law, 80 and by the House of Lords, which overruled the earlier judgment. 81 Further support for this conclusion comes from the international bodies concerned with the implementation of the UNCAT 82 and in particular from their reactions to the decision of the Court of Appeal in A and Others, which all stressed the blanket nature of the exclusionary rule. 83 The identity of the torturer state and the forum state are accordingly of no relevance to Article 15 UNCAT. 84 It is therefore to be welcomed that the House of Lords came to the same conclusion.
General Considerations under the ECHR
The case of A and Others also raises several points under Article 3 ECHR, which will be discussed in turn.
(a) Duty to Protect under Article 3 ECHR
It has been said that the use of evidence that another state has obtained by torture has the effect of making the acts of torture worthwhile and even of encouraging torture. 85 This raises the question of whether the use of evidence obtained by torture in these circumstances might even be in violation of Article 3 ECHR. To be sure, the obvious violation of the prohibition of torture is committed by another state, but Article 3 ECHR also includes a number of -positive as well as negative -duties to protect persons from being tortured. 86 On that basis, it might be argued that there is a duty See also Warbrick, supra note 4, at 1012. Art. 15 does not, however, apply to torture by private persons (see Art. 1 UNCAT). not to encourage foreign states to commit acts of torture, which would be a negative duty to protect. Such a duty would be somewhat similar to the obligation not to extradite or expel a person if there is a real risk of that person being tortured in the receiving state, 87 in that both constructions of Article 3 ECHR would require the state not to adopt a certain course of action in order to protect persons from torture in a foreign state. 88 However, the similarities end on closer examination: firstly, the mere encouragement of torture inherent in a court decision making it worthwhile will rarely, if ever, provide sufficient evidence of a 'real risk' 89 of torture, arising for any person from that court decision. Secondly and more decisively, such a negative obligation also seems impossible to reconcile with the limited reach of the ECHR under its Article 1, which requires that the person holding the right be 'under the jurisdiction' of the state party to the ECHR. This requirement is readily fulfilled in the Soering line of cases, because the person concerned is initially in the territory of the state party and is there subjected to the act of extradition or expulsion.
90 By contrast, the persons benefiting from the negative obligation discussed here are at no material time in the forum state and the forum state only has some slight influence on whether they will be tortured or not. Such a limited influence relating only to the ambit of one Convention right is not sufficient for Article 1 ECHR, 91 so that the obligation not to make torture worthwhile cannot result from a duty to protect under Article 3 ECHR. It should be noted in this respect that the recognition of a foreign judgment is nearly equivalent to a judgment by the recognizing court itself, being subject to execution in the same manner as a domestic judgment. This special significance suggests that the issue of the acceptance of evidence obtained by another state is not in fact comparable to the facts of Pellegrini. A ruling on the admissibility of evidence does not lend the court's power to the foreign act of investigation, and, in other words, does not transform the foreign power into the domestic legal system. The proposed analogy to the rule stated in Pellegrini is therefore not appropriate.
Article 6(1) ECHR
The presentation of evidence obtained by the acts of torture of a foreign state again raises different problems under Article 6(1) ECHR, depending on whether the evidence is used against the victim of torture or against a third person. In the former case, the solution appears clear: the rule against self-incrimination consists of two separate parts, the prohibition of any pressure to incriminate oneself and the rule on the inadmissibility of such evidence. 95 If a foreign state has exerted the pressure, a state party to the ECHR therefore remains bound to rule the resulting statements inadmissible. 96 If, on the other hand, the evidence is used against someone other than the victim of torture, the considerations as to the reliability of evidence and the rights of the defence set out above remain relevant. 97 Besides, the admission against any person of evidence obtained illegally by a foreign state may be compared to the admission of evidence thus obtained by a private person without the instigation of the forum state. 98 In such a case, the ECtHR has held in Schenk v. Switzerland that the admission as evidence of a telephone call illegally recorded by a private person did not render a trial unfair, as the rights of the defence relating to that piece of evidence were preserved and the judgment was not based exclusively on the recording. 99 Nevertheless, the illegality of that part of the investigation was a factor in the determination of the fairness of the proceedings and the additional factor of the unreliability of statements 95 In Saunders, supra note 46, Art. 6 ECHR was not applicable to the duty of self-incrimination (which arose outside civil or criminal proceedings), so the ECtHR was exclusively concerned with the use of the statement made by the applicant (ibid., at para. 67). made under torture, with the resulting disadvantages for the defence, 100 suggests a different outcome if the evidence was obtained by a (private or foreign) breach not of Article 8 ECHR, but of Article 3. 101 In particular, the balancing exercise inherent in determining whether a trial was fair, 102 according to which flagrant breaches of the law make it impossible for a court bound by the rule of law to entertain the results, 103 means that the violation of the absolute prohibition of torture will always outweigh any interest in using the evidence concerned. 104 The admission of evidence obtained by torture is therefore contrary to Article 6(1) ECHR, regardless of where and by whom the act of torture was committed. 105 Thus, the holding of the House of Lords is again proved right.
Customary International Law
Apart from treaty law, the rule on the inadmissibility of evidence obtained by torture may also exist as part of customary international law. 106 In this respect, it may be observed that general international law may lead to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained by torture in two separate ways. Firstly, the special status of the prohibition of torture as a rule of international jus cogens 107 may oblige states to refuse to accept any results arising from its violation by another state. Secondly, state practice and opinio juris as the necessary ingredients of customary law 108 may have given rise to an independent rule on the admissibility of such evidence. The nature of the prohibition of torture as jus cogens may be said to imply that, in the case of a violation of the prohibition by one state, other states must distance themselves from the breach of jus cogens, in particular by refusing to give any effect or recognition to the foreign conduct in question. Certainly, the VCLT, which contains the most famous recognition of jus cogens, envisages this kind of rule only as invalidating any conflicting prior or subsequent treaty 109 and does not extend the concept any further, but this need not be taken as ruling out any further effects. 110 The VCLT only deals with treaty law, so its drafters could hardly have been expected to address any other implications of their recognition of jus cogens, and it appears plausible that a rule which is powerful enough to limit the treaty-making power of states should also have a broader effect. 111 The leading pronouncement on these further rules following from the jus cogensrank of the prohibition of torture is without doubt the judgment of the ICTY in Furundžija. 112 The Tribunal there regarded as effects of international jus cogens that national acts condoning torture would be unlawful and that there was universal criminal jurisdiction to try suspected torturers. 113 Thus, it may be argued that even condoning torture is a violation of international law 114 and that no state may therefore use evidence obtained by torture because it would otherwise seek gain from the violation of jus cogens and thus lend its implicit support to this violation of the core interests of the international community. 115 This also sits easily with the universal jurisdiction over the crime of torture (whether or not it exists as a direct consequence of jus cogens), 116 because it is inconceivable that a state could at the same time regard conduct as a serious crime and knowingly make use of it as a source of evidence. 117 The latter conduct would fly in the face of the desire of international law to comprehensively outlaw any acts of torture, including at the level of criminal law.
The nature of the prohibition of torture as jus cogens therefore means that also the use of evidence obtained by torture is unlawful, wherever the act of torture may have taken place.
(b) Customary Law Directly on the Use of Evidence Obtained by Torture
Although this result tends to negate the need for a rule of ordinary customary international law on the inadmissibility of statements made under torture, state practice and opinio juris may nevertheless have established such a rule. 120 Again, there are two routes by which such a rule of customary law may have come into existence, provided by the different sources and contexts of the relevant state practice: Article 15 UNCAT and its background and progeny on the one hand and the right to a fair trial on the other. However, considering that the question is a limited one, relating only to the existence or otherwise of a rule of evidence and not relating to any specific context, the two routes should be seen as mutually reinforcing rather than separate. It is therefore to be noted that, as of 31 December 2002, the UNCAT had acquired 132 states parties and had been signed by another nine states 121 and that many states have exclusionary rules on coerced statements. 122 The requisite opinio juris is then provided by resolutions of the UN General Assembly, 123 i.e. the UN Declaration of 1975, 124 the mandate of the drafters of the UNCAT, which suggests an emphasis on codification, 125 and the repetition of the terms of Article 15 UNCAT in General Assembly Resolution 59/182 of 20 December 2004. The customary validity of the rule of Article 15 UNCAT was also never actively disputed. 126 Considering also the similarly widespread practice relating to the right to a fair trial, it may therefore be said that the obligation of Article 15 UNCAT has achieved customary status.
D The Use of Tainted Evidence in the Courts of a State Implicated in the Act of Torture
Besides the situations where the acts of torture have been committed either by the forum state or entirely and without any connivance by the forum state by another state, it is possible that the state in which the information is later used in court was complicit in the act of torture. For example, the United States are said to pursue a programme of sending suspected terrorists to countries where torture is relatively commonplace, presumably in the knowledge that torture may be used also in those cases and perhaps even with the intention of thus receiving information that would not otherwise be forthcoming; this practice is apparently known as 'extraordinary rendition'. 128 Whatever the truth of these allegations, 129 the legal situation at least under Article 15 UNCAT seems clear, i.e. the results of any such enterprise would be inadmissible as evidence in any court of law. If the wording is wide enough to cover both the cases where the forum state has itself tortured and the case where it has not been a party to the breach of the prohibition of torture, 130 it must certainly also extend to this case, which lies between the other two propositions.
As far as Article 6(1) ECHR (or, in the case of the United States, Article 14(1)(2) ICCPR), is concerned, the only new question arising from this state of affairs appears to be that of the illegality of the alleged US conduct, which also affects the admissibility of any evidence thus obtained. 131 Again, the answer appears to be clear. The rendition of a person to a foreign state where there is a real risk of torture violates Article 3 ECHR 132 and Article 7 ICCPR. 133 Problems may only arise in this regard if the person in question was never on the territory of the state party in question and therefore arguably not 'under the jurisdiction' of that state in the sense of Articles 1 ECHR, 2 ICCPR. 134 However, if a state removes a person to another state, it must, at some point, have complete physical control over that person; 'jurisdiction' in the sense of Articles 1 ECHR, 2 ICCPR therefore exists. 135 It may therefore be concluded that the (apparent) US practice of 'extraordinary rendition' is or would be in violation of Article 7 ICCPR. 136 It follows that the situation where the forum state is thus implicated in the act of torture is not materially different from the case in which it has itself committed the unlawful act. 137 
Conclusion
It has been observed that the inadmissibility of statements made under torture, as based on international law, does not depend on any further considerations, be they related to the identity of the torturer state or to the persons concerned. This conclusion is in line with the general attitude international law takes towards the practice of torture and therefore underlines that the exclusionary rule 'is a function of the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture'. 138 It may therefore be said that international law provides a comprehensive set of rules to combat torture 139 and that the inadmissibility of evidence found to have been obtained by coercion is an important tool designed to eradicate torture once and for all. 140 The House of Lords deserves praise for making this very clear and for finally overruling the unfortunate precedent set by the Court of Appeal.
